The Copenhagen Accord is dead, in its coffin and getting buried. Its ghost is roaming though – slacking already unambitious climate pledges here, excusing development aid cuts there.

Today another shovel of dirt was tossed on the grave as an internal email from executive-secretary of the UN Climate Conference, Yvo de Boer, was published in The Guardian (Copenhagen climate failure blamed on 'Danish text') citing a new book by Danish journalist Per Meilstrup. It looks like the book is a comprehensive disclosure of the months long battle between then Minister of Climate, Connie Hedegaard, and her progressive line on one side and the more cynic Prime Minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen.

Take a look at the email from Yvo de Boer to his colleagues (my bold added):

Everyone recognised that CoP15 would be significant. This led to a heightened sense of nervousness among Parties [countries] throughout the year. A few unfortunate moves aside, The Danish Presidency managed to build quite a lot of trust in spite of this. At the pre-CoP there was, I think, broad support for a package of decisions that would lay the foundation for the subsequent adoption of a new legal instrument under the Convention and something close to consensus on a second Kyoto period.

The Danish paper presented at an informal meeting a week before the CoP destroyed two years of effort in one fell swoop. All our attempts to prevent this paper happening failed. The meeting at which it was presented was unannounced and the paper unbalanced. It also revealed that there were two schools of thought within the Danish Presidency.

Earlier references to a politically binding agreement (an oxymoron if ever I saw one) had already heightened nervousness. Now it became clear that a comprehensive package was perhaps not everyone's view of a desirable outcome. Subsequent announcements of papers that never came but still some saw, had two significant impacts.

First delegates were ready to embrace enthusiastically what they had thus far resisted: text from Michael and John. This attempt by Parties to get things back under their control had two important consequences. First it gave us two documents (or sets of documents) that we can continue to work with. Secondly suspicion that something else was being cooked behind the scenes, the early arrival of Ministers and the launch of a process among a small number of Heads of state paralysed the ability of Parties to make advances on the key political issues in the informal plenary and some of the contact groups. Smaller group meetings did not enjoy consensus. Ministers had turned their attention to their Heads of state. The focus of the process shifted. The first layer broke down.

The second layer was mixed with the first. It centred around a view from within the [Danish] PM's office that the outcome of the CoP should be a declaration rather than a package of decisions. Although a second Danish paper never formally saw the light of day at the beginning of the second week, consolations were taking place. The announcement of the Prime Minister taking-over [from Connie Hedegaard], shifted attention away from the formal process. 24 hours were lost in trying to establish some kind of small group process. When Connie finally managed to arrange a meeting with the G77 on how to proceed, the process under the PM had taken over.

Another 12 hours had passed, the PM finally managed to bring a small group together. This group was built around the Copenhagen Commitment Circle, a small number of HoS [Heads of State] that had been regularly discussing progress in the run-up to the CoP. Seeing that further work in this group would undermined trust and transparency even more, the PM backed away from taking further initiative.

The third layer consisted of a small number of countries trying to rescue the CoP and still achieve a result. Bilateral and trilateral consultations among Parties did not lead to a coherent way forward and the PM was asked to take control again. This he did by bringing together the 30 or so countries that brokered the Accord.

Our attempts to create a basis for discussion that would advance agreement on 1/CoP15 and 1/CMO5 failed. The text was silent on the future of the Kyoto protocol and any reference to a future legally binding instrument. Through a disorganised and ill-directed sherpa process a document emerged that became the Accord. Frantic behind the scenes diplomacy by major countries let to its ultimate adoption in a small circle.

By then we had the Friday informal High Level Event behind us. A small group of countries, reflecting a much broader discontent with the process, made it clear that they would not accept a backroom deal brokered by the super powers. Not enough was done to sell the Accord, especially within the G77. When it reached the plenary, attempts to get regional groups to discuss it failed. Complete chaos resulted.

Here we reached the very edge of the abyss. Although here was by then almost universal support to adopt the Accord, hammering it through against consensus would have created mass protest. Attempts to overrule this would have destroyed the credibility of the process. Consensus may be difficult to achieve, but if it is what you have, it must be respected.

The Lumumba [Di-Aping, G77 spokesperson] effect then kicked-in. The outrageous statements [which he made] prompted many Parties to take the floor and say they were in fact willing to accept the Accord as an outcome. I think it took about five hours to get through the worst plenary I can remember and finally a decision was take to note the Accord.

Does this spell the end of the UNFCCC process? That is what many were saying. Parties that participate in the most un-transparent backroom dealing I have ever seen are certainly expression frustration at their failure to force a stronger result. Over time I hope they will see this failure as a blessing.

Democracy is time consuming and can be frustrating, but it builds a stronger future. We have an incredible architecture under the UNFCCC and attempts to reconstruct it among a smaller circle could take a decade. Investing in managing our process properly is a better way to go.

Inviting HoS seemed like a good idea, but it seriously backfired. Their early arrival as well as that of Ministers did not have the catalytic effect hoped-for. The process became paralysed. Rumour and intrigue took over.

What I have written is only the tip of the iceberg. Much more went on. As I said, we need to think this through more deeply and learn from it. But let's do that after a good rest!

Per Meilstrups book is in Danish. It has a complimentary blog, also in Danish: KAMPEN OM KLIMAET: Bloggen. It has so far had the effect of an opposition politician formally asking the Prime Minister in parliament: “Will the prime minister now ensure that a thorough evaluation of the course of events before and during COP15 is undertaken to prevent similar serious mistakes in important international negotiations” (my own translation). Which is a good question because – as readers of my column here will know – the Danish government has refused such an evaluation thus far and were squirming when their own internal evaluation report was leaked (TH!NK3 / Secret evaluation of COP15 leaked from Danish government).

Update: Full text of Yvo de Boers email

Yvo de Boer to colleagues re COP15

Truly devoted readers of my writings will remember my TH!NK2 articles Something is rotten in the state of COP15 and The state of COP15 increasingly rotten: Secrets about the “Danish text”, the mass arrests and more. I have a strong suspicion I was then hinting and speculating at some of the stuff Per Meilstrup is now documenting.