Following the climate summit in Copenhagen, December 2009, there has been some (but not much) debate about why the world got the Copenhagen Accord instead of a legally binding, fair and ambitous treaty. Considering the onslaught of hype such as the Hopenhagen campaign and the 100,000+ people in the Danish streets one could have gotten the impression more was on the way. The role of the Danish government could appear a bit suspicious – especially in the light of the leaked “Danish text”.

Some debate ensued in Danish parliament: see the January 2010 TH!NK2 articles Danish prime minister grilled on COP15 and Danish parliament evaluating COP15. At these debates the Danish prime minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, rejected proposals to have an evaluation of the whole COP15 undertaken. That's why it's a bit entertaining to see an internal government evaluation report on the front page of Danish newspaper POLITIKEN today (most text in print edition only).

What is less entertaining is the prospects for future global cooperation and partnership (MDG #8) in the light of it.

COP15 according to the Danish government

Let us rewrite COP15 history with a few quotes from the leaked evaluation right away.

December 2008: Connie Hedegaard (at the time Danish minister of climate) says: “In these crucial negotiations, Denmark will serve as your broker. We will do our utmost to be everyone's COP15 President. From now on we are not Denmark, not the EU, not Annex 1. We will listen carefully to all countries – and we promise to work hard to ensure transparency and create consensus.” The leaked evaluation, however, describes unofficial talks with individual groups of countries and an alliance with USA.

Early 2009: The Danish government decided “there were no grounds to seek a new legally binding agreement” because of the low possibility it “would allow the US taking up a legal regime that was built around the Kyoto Protocol”. In other words: Total alignment with US policy from a year in advance of the summit, say one thing in the press while drawing up something entirely different for the summit.

July 2009: At a meeting of the major industrialized nations in L'Aquila, Italy the Danish government discussed the possibility of a non-binding, voluntary outcome of COP15.

November 2009: The goal of a non-binding, voluntary outcome was “further consolidated” at the pre-COP15. No wonder the participating politicians fled out the back door, avoiding cameras and activists waiting outside.

Wednesday the 16^th of December 2009: The Danish Text is leaked. At the time the Danish government officially denies this text is the official proposal for an agreement but the leaked report confirms it was the “first Danish draft agreement” and reveals the government feared it would now “not even be possible to adopt a minimal political statement and that the meeting would end up in a complete collapse”.

Friday the 19^th of December 2009: Obama arrives and is given the depressing news of a COP15 chairman who has lost all hope but still insists on trying to create some new progress in the negotiations.

On closing COP15 Lars Løkke Rasmussen said: “We reached an agreement and it is an agreement that will work. There may be a handful of countries choosing not to sign, but we've got a strong start”. The internal report says: “The ambition level of [limiting global warming to] two degrees reflects consensus on the goal, but the level of detail is less than desired, especially by Europe and likeminded countries, and the Copenhagen Accord initially contains only empty Appendixes”. Not exactly identical messages.

February 2010: Lars Løkke Rasmussen says: “I do not recognize the description of Denmark aligned with USA. There has been no strategy to follow the United States.”

So what?

Politicians saying one thing while doing another may not come as a huge shock to everyone. Politicians not advertising their mistakes even less so.

Where the report is surprisingly rewealing is by acknowledging how the Danish government did “not build the necessary trust” with the UNFCCC and Yvo de Boer. Further, the evaluation describes how “the UN as an organization was divided” between Ban Ki-Moon supporting the Danish strategy and the UNFCCC sceptical of it.

The significance of the leaked Danish Text is evaluated as not being in its content but in the way it was spinned, uniting the developing nations in obstructing the negotiations.

So the divisions ran deeper than what was revealed in media at the time. And how is a UN negotiation supposed to lead to anything if the host country and the responsible UN office doesn't trust each other?

Neither people from the UN or the Danish government has commented on this leaked evaluation.